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1 Introduction
A game with communication arises when players have the opportunity to
communicate with one other prior to the choice of actions in the actual game.
The presence of a mediator is a particularly powerful device in such games
because it allows players to use correlated strategies- the mediator (privately)
recommends actions to each player according to the realization of an agreed
upon correlation device over the set of strategy n-tuples. Of course, the
use of correlated strategies can in principle allow players to achieve higher
expected payo¤s than those possible through independent randomisations of
strategies.
A correlated equilibrium is a self-enforcing correlated strategy n-tuple
because no individual has an incentive to deviate from the recommendation
received by her, given the information at her disposal. This information is
simply the recommendation received by her and the (prior) probability with
which each strategy n-tuple was to be chosen. In particular, she has no
information about the recommendations received by others- unless she can
infer these from her own recommendation and the prior probability distrib-
ution over the set of strategy n-tuples. However, if players can communicate
with each other, then it is natural to ask whether coalitions of players can-
not exchange information about the recommendations received by them and
plan mutually benecial joint deviations. Although pre-play communication
opens up the possibility of sharing information about the recommendations
received by di¤erent players, there may still be constraints on the extent
of information which can be shared by di¤erent players. The possibility of
constraints on information sharing has been recognised in the literature on
cooperative game theory with incomplete information ever since the classic
paper of Wilson (1978). These constraints are clearly present in the present
context since the recommendation received by each player i can be viewed
as her type".
Wilson (1978) dened two polar solution concepts - the coarse core and
the ne core of an exchange economy with private information. The coarse
core corresponds to the case where deviating coalitions cannot share any
information about their types, so that blocking plans have to be drawn up
on common knowledge events. The ne core corresponds to the case where
there is no constraint on information sharing within a coalition. Dutta and
Vohra(2005) argue that both notions are extreme in the sense that the typical
situation is one where some but not all information can be shared. They
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propose a notion of the credible core, which allows for information-sharing
which is credible.1
In this paper too, we impose the requirement that members of a deviating
coalition can only share credible" information about the recommendations
received by them. Given this basic premise, we dene two renements of
correlated equilibria. The rst concept is analogous to that of strong Nash
equilibrium. A correlated strategy n-tuple is a strong correlated equilibrium if
it is immune to deviations by coalitions of essentially myopic players who do
not anticipate any further deviations after the coalition has implemented its
blocking plan. The second concept is that of coalition-proof correlated equi-
librium. According to this concept, coalitions take into account the possiblity
that sub-coalitions may enforce further deviations.
Notice that in our framework, coalitions plan deviations at the interim
stage - that is, after the mediator has communicated his recommendation to
each player. Of course, coalitions could also form at the ex ante stage, that is
before the mediator has communicated his recommendatons to the players.
Moreno and Wooders (1996), Milgrom and Roberts (1996) focus on these
ex ante concepts. We comment on the relationship between their solution
concepts and ours in section 3. In particular, we construct a 2-person game
which has no interim coalition-proof equilibrium, although coalition proof
equilibria in the ex ante sense always exist in 2-person games. In section 4,
we focus on strong correlated equilibrium. We construct examples to show
that there is no connection between the existence of strong Nash equikibria
and strong correlated equilibrium. We also show that a class of positive
externality games studied by Konishi et al (1997a) ensure the existence of
strong correlated equilibrium. Finally, in section 5, we switch attention to
(interim) coalition proof correlated equilibrium. We show that if a pure
strategy action prole Pareto dominates all other pure strategy proles which
survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, then it must
be an interim coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. We also show that if
the action sets of all individuals is restricted to two identical actions, then all
positive externality games have interim correlated coalition proof equilibria.
1For instance, in the lemons problem, the seller cannot credibly claim to be the high-
quality seller.
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2 Notions of Interim Coalitional Equilibrium
Let N denote the set of players, indexed by i = 1; 2; ::; n. Each player
has a nite set of pure strategies, Ai with generic element ai. A denotes
the Cartesian product, A =
Q
i2N Ai: The utility of player i is given by
ui : A! <
A correlated strategy  is a probability distribution over A.
We consider an extended game with a mediator. Before the game is
played, a mediator privately sends recommendations to the players, a; cho-
sen according to the probability distribution . Each player observes his
recommendation and then proceeds to playing the game. As opposed to
Moreno and Wooders (1996), Ray (1996) and Milgrom and Roberts (1996),
we analyze deviations at the interim stage, when every player has received
his recommendation.
Consider a correlated strategy  and coalition S. Suppose members of S
have privately received the recommendations a S. How can they plan mu-
tually benecial deviations from ? Any plans to block"  must depend
crucially on their beliefs about the realization of . Moreover, each individ-
ual is belief about the realization of  depends upon the recommendation
received by i himself as well as the information about a S which can be cred-
ibly transmitted by members of S to each other. In what follows, we adapt
the notion of the credible core of Dutta and Vohra (2005) to this setting.
Suppose all members of S believe that the recommendations received by
the players lie in some subset E of A. We will call such a set E an admissible
event, and describe some restrictions which must be satised by such an
event. First, an element a0 S can be ruled out only by using the private
information of members of S. Since we will use conditional expected utilities
to evaluate action proles, we can without loss of generality express this
requirement as E = ES  A S. Second, if i 2 S, then her claim that she
has not received recommendation a0i cannot depend on the claims made by
other members of S. Hence, ES must be the cartesian product of some set
fEigi2S. Third, no agent can, after receiving her own recommendation, rule
out the possibility that the true" prole of recommendations lies in the set
E. Hence, an admissible set for the coalition S, must satisfy the following.
Denition 1 Given  and aS, an event E is admissible for S if and only if
E =
Y
i2S
Ei
Y
A S; and
X
ga i2E i
(ai; fa i) > 0 for all i 2 S:
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where
E i =
Y
j2Sni
Ej
Y
A S
Given an admissible event E, we dene player i0s conditional probability
of a i given ai and E as
e(a ijai; E i) = (a i; ai)P
ga i2E i (ai; fa i) :
We also dene the marginal probability over a S given ai and E as:
(a Sjai; E i) =
X
Sni2j2SniEj
e(aS; Snijai; E i):
A blocking plan for coalition S, S; is a correlated strategy over AS.
Once the blocking plan is implemented, a player i in S has the following
posterior belief over the actions in the game:
i(a) = (a Sjai; E i)S(aS):
Given ai and E, player i evaluates the correlated strategy  according to:
Ui(jai; E i) =
X
a i2E i
e(a ijai; E i)ui(ai; a i):
Player i evaluates the blocking plan according to:
Ui(Sjai; E i) =
X
ea2A i(ea)ui(ea)
Denition 1 ensures that if members of S each claim to have received rec-
ommendations in the set Ei, then no individual in S can conclude that some
individual has lied given knowledge of his own recommendation. Notice that
this condition places some restriction on how large an admissible event can
be. However, this condition by itself does not guarantee that each individual
in S will believe the claims of other members of S. We explain below why
there should be some restriction on how small an admissible event must be
before individuals can agree on a plan to block a correlated strategy .
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Suppose E is an admissible event for coalition S, and i 2 S. We want
to rule out the possibility that i after receiving a recommendation a0i =2 Ei
actually claims to have received a recommendation in Ei.
Let Vi(E) = fa0i 2 AinEij there is a i 2 E i such that (a i; a0i) > 0g.
So, if the other individuals in S independently claimed to have received
recommendations in E i, then i believes that she can declare to have received
a recommendation in Vi(E).
For any coalition S, a blocking plan S on an admissible event E satises
self selection if for all i 2 S and all a0i 2 Vi(E),
Ui(ja0i; E i) > Ui(Sja0i; E i) (1)
Self-selection guarantees that if i has agreed to the blocking plan S, then i
will not falsely claim to have received a recommendation in Ei.
Denition 2 A coalition S blocks the correlated strategy  if there exists a
blocking plan S and admissible event E such that
(i) S satises self-selection on E.
(ii) For all i 2 S, Ui(jai; E i) < Ui(Sjai; E i) at some aS 2 ES.
The denition of self-selection is similar to that used by Dutta and Vohra
(2005) in the denition of the credible core of an exchange economy with
incomplete information. The underlying idea is the same: if members of a
coalition agree to a blocking plan, this information should be used to update
playersinformation over the recommendations received by other players in
the coalition. In other words, E denes the event for which all players in
S have an incentive to accept the blocking plan S. Every player in S thus
updates his beliefs by assuming that players in Sni have received recom-
mendations in
Q
j2Sni
Ej. If given these updated beliefs, all players in S have
an incentive to accept the blocking plan S, then the coalition S blocks the
correlated strategy at aS:
Denition 3 A correlated strategy  is an interim strong correlated equilib-
rium (ISCE) if there exists no coalition S that blocks .
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If the coalition S is a singleton, E i = A i and the self-selection constraint
is vacuous. A singleton coalition fig thus blocks the correlated strategy  if
there exists a mixed strategy i such that Ui(jai; A i) < Ui(ijai; A i).
Hence, for singleton coalitions, our denition corresponds to the usual den-
ition of correlated equilibrium.
As with the concept of strong Nash equilibrium, the concept of interim
strong correlation equilibrium implicitly assumes that players are myopic
when they plan deviations. In particular, the deviating coalition does not
take into account the possibility that there may be further deviations. Sev-
eral papers dene di¤erent notions of coalitional stability when players are
farsighted in the context of games with complete information.2 Moreno and
Wooders (1996) dene a notion of (ex ante) coalition proof correlated equi-
librium when coalitions form before players receive recommendations from
the mediator. As in the original denition of coalition proof equilibrium for
complete information games, their denition explicitly takes into account the
possibility that subcoalitions may carry out further deviations.
We now dene a notion of coalition proof equilibrium when coalitions
form after players have received recommendations from the mediator. Notice
that if a nested sequence of coalitions each form blocking plans, then the
posterior beliefs of players later on" in the sequence keep changing. For
suppose the original correlated strategy is , and coalition S1 considers a
blocking plan S1 on the admissible event E
1. Then, players in S1 believe
that the recommendations sent by the mediator lie in the set E1. Moreover,
the posterior beliefs of players in S1 are di¤erent from their prior beliefs.
Now, consider stage 2" when the coalition S2  S1 contemplates a blocking
plan S2 on the admissible event E
2. First, their prior beliefs coincide with
the posterior beliefs formed at the end of stage 1. Second, players in S2
now believe that the mediator has recommended an action prole in E2.
Implemention of the blocking plan S2 will result in a new set of posterior
beliefs for players in S2, and this change in posterior beliefs will also change
the way in which players evaluate blocking plans. This needs to be kept
in mind when dening an interim notion of coalition proofness, and also
provides the motivation for the following denitions.
Consider a coalition S  N , and a blocking sequence B = f(Sk; Sk ; Ek)gKk=1
to the correlated strategy , where
2See, amongst others, Chwe (1994), Bernheim, Whinston and Peleg (1987), Ray and
Vohra (1997).
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(i) S1  S, and for each k = 2; : : : ; K, Sk  Sk 1.
(ii) E1 is an admissible event for S1, and for each k > 1 Eki  Ek 1i for
i 2 Sk, and Eki = Ek 1i for i =2 Sk.
(iii) Each Sk satises self-selection on E
k.
(iv) Each Sk is a correlated strategy over ASk .
We can now dene the posterior beliefs of each coalition guring in the
blocking sequence as well as how members of these coalitions evaluate the
blocking plans.
Let 0(a)  (a) for all a 2 A. Choose any k 2 f1; : : : ; Kg, and i 2 Sk.
Then, ek(a ijai; Ek i) = k 1(a i; ai)P
ga i2Ek i 
k 1(ai; fa i) :
Similarly, the marginal probability over a Sk given ai and E is:
k(a Sk jai; Ek i) =
X

Skni2j2SkniEkj
ek(aSk ; Sknijai; Ek i):
Once the blocking plan k is implemented, a player i in Sk has the fol-
lowing posterior belief over the actions in the game:
ki (a) = 
k(a Sk jai; Ek i)Sk(aSk):
In order to dene the concept of interim coalition proof correlated equi-
librium (ICPCE), we rst dene the notion of self-enforcing blocking plans.
Denition 4 Let T be any coalition.
(i) If jT 1j = 1, say i 2 T 1, then any mixed strategy i is a self-enforcing
blocking plan against any correlated strategy .
(ii) Recursively, suppose self-enforcing blocking plans have been dened
for all coalitions of size (jT 1j   1) or smaller against any correlated strategy.
Then, T 1 has a self-enforcing blocking plan T 1 against the correlated strategy
 if
(a) There is an admissible event E1 such that T 1 satises self-selection
on E1, and
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(b) There is no coalition T 2  T 1 with a self-enforcing blocking plan T 2
and admissible event E2 such that for the blocking sequence f(T 1; T 1 ; E1); (T 2; T 2 ; E2)g
and for some aT 2 2 E2T 2X
a i2E2
e2(a ijai; E2 i)ui(ai; a i) <X
a2A
2i (a)ui(a) for all i 2 T 2
An interim coalition proof correlated equilibrium (ICPCE) is a correlated
strategy against which no coalition has a self-enforcing blocking plan which
makes everyone in the deviating coalition strictly better o¤.
Denition 5 A correlated strategy  is ICPCE if there is no coalition S
with a self-enforcing blocking plan S against  such that
(i) S satises self-selection on some admissible event E.
(ii) For all i 2 S, Ui(jai; E i) < Ui(Sjai; E i) at some aS 2 ES.
Some remarks are in order. First, any strong correlated equilibrium is a
coalition proof correlated equilibrium, as any self-enforcing blocking plan is a
blocking plan. Second, because any blocking plan by a single player coalition
is self-enforcing, any coalition proof correlated equilibrium is a correlated
equilibrium. Finally, as opposed to the classical notion of coalition proof
equilibria, the set of coalition proof correlated equilibria in two-player games
is not equal to the set of undominated correlated equilibria. In our model,
deviations occur at the interim stage, and players may have a joint incentive
to deviate after a realization in the support of an undominated correlated
equilibrium.
3 Related denitions of strong and coalition
proof correlated equilibrium
Di¤erent denitions of strong and coalition proof correlated equilibria have
already been proposed in the literature. Moreno and Wooders (1996) and
Milgrom and Roberts (1996) consider coalitional deviations at the ex ante
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stage, before agents have received their recommendations.3 Formally, in their
setting, a blocking plan is a mapping S from AS to AS, assigning a corre-
lated strategy over AS to any possible recommendation aS: All computations
are made ex ante. Players evaluate the correlated strategy  according to the
expected utility
Ui() =
X
a2A
(a)ui(a):
Given a blocking plan S against the correlated strategy , the induced
distribution over actions is given by
b(a) = X
S2AS
(S; a S)S(aSjS)
and players evaluate the blocking plan according to
Ui(S) =
X
a2A
b(a)ui(a)
If coalitions form at the ex ante stage, players must decide on their block-
ing plans in a state of symmetric information. Hence, one need not worry
about the sharing of information inside a coalition. This implies that the
ex ante denitions of strong correlated equilibrium and coalition proof cor-
related equilibrium are considerably simpler than in our model.
Denition 6 A correlated strategy  is an ex ante strong correlated equilib-
rium (ESCE) if there exists no coalition S and blocking plan S such that
Ui(S) > Ui() for all i 2 S.
In order to economise on notation, we dene self-enforcing ex ante block-
ing plans informally. As before, they are dened recursively. Any blocking
plan by a one-player coalition is self-enforcing. Given that self-enforcing
blocking plans have been dened for all coalitions T with jT j < jSj, a block-
ing plan S generating a distribution b is self-enforcing, if there exists no
coalition T  S, and self-enforcing blocking plan T for T generating a dis-
tribution cT such that Ui(bT ) > Ui(b) for all i in T .
3Ray (1996) also proposes a notion of coalition proof correlated equilibrium at the ex
ante stage. Intuitively, his concept di¤ers from Moreno and Wooders (1996)s, Milgrom
and Roberts (1996)s and ours in that deviating coalitions cannot choose a new correlation
device, but must abide by the xed correlation device of the extended game.
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Denition 7 A correlated strategy  is a ex ante coalition proof correlated
equilibrium (ECPCE) if there is no coalition S and self-enforcing blocking
plan S such that Ui(S) > Ui() for all i 2 S.
Coalitional incentives to block at the ex ante and interim stage cannot be
compared. On the one hand, it may be easier for coalitions to block at the ex
ante stage. Consider for example a correlated strategy in a two-player game
putting equal weight on two outcomes with payo¤s (0; 3) and (3; 0). At the
ex ante stage, this correlated strategy has expected value 1:5 for every player,
and would be blocked by another outcome with payo¤s (2; 2). However, at
the interim stage, neither of the two realizations can be blocked by both
players. On the other hand, coalitions may nd it easier to block at the
interim stage, when a correlated strategy puts weight on an outcome with
very low payo¤s for the players. The following example illustrates this point
in a two-player game where a correlated strategy puts positive weight on
an outcome which is Pareto-dominated by another outcome. At the ex-ante
stage, the correlated strategy is not dominated, but at the interim stage, for
some realization, both players have an incentive to block. This example also
highlights another di¤erence between ICPCE and ECPCE - the former may
fail to exist even in two-person games, whereas ECPCE always exist in such
games.
Example 1 Consider a two-player game where player 1 chooses the row and
player 2 the column.
b1 b2 b3
a1 4; 4 0; 0 0; 4:1
a2 1; 1 1; 1  1; 0
a3 0; 0 0; 1 2; 2
This game possesses two pure strategy Nash equilibria (a2; b2) and (a3; b3).
Consider the correlated strategy  placing probability 1=2 on (a1; b1); and
1=4 on (a2; b1) and (a2; b2). It is clear that player 1 has no incentive to devi-
ate from the recommendations of the correlated strategy. When the column
player receives recommendation b2, she has no incentive to deviate either.
When she receives b1; her expected payo¤ is 4  2=3 + 1=3 = 3. By deviating
to b3, she would receive an expected payo¤ of 4:1  2=3 = 8:2=3 < 3. Hence
the correlated strategy  is a correlated equilibrium, which gives every player
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an expected payo¤ of 3 and hence Pareto-dominates the two pure strategy
Nash equilibria.
However the correlated equilibrium  can be blocked by both players at
the realization (a2; b2) where they both receive an expected payo¤of 1, which
is Pareto-dominated by the pure strategy Nash equilibria (a3; b3). Hence,
neither the two pure strategy Nash equilibria nor the correlated equilibrium
 are CPCE of the game.
We still need to check that there is no other correlated equilibrium which
would be immune to coalitional deviations. By the argument above, any
correlated equilibrium putting weight on the cell (a2; b2) is dominated. Fur-
thermore, if b2 is not played, a2 is strictly dominated by a1 and if a2 is not
played, b1 and b2 are strictly dominated by b3. Hence, if a correlated equi-
librium does not put weight on the outcome (a2; b2), it cannot put weight
on the strategies a2, b1 and b2. But this implies that the only other candi-
dates for correlated equilibrium must put all the weight on the column player
choosing b3 and the only possible outcome is (a3; b3). Hence, any correlated
equilibrium in the game must either put weight on (a2; b2) or concentrate all
the weight on (a3; b3), so that the game has no ICPCE.
Einy and Peleg (1995) dene an interim notion of strong and coalition
proof correlated equilibrium. Their concept di¤ers from ours in two impor-
tant respects. First, they assume that members of a blocking coalition freely
share information about their recommendations.4 Second, they assume that
a coalition blocks if all its members are made better o¤ for any realization
of the initial correlated strategy. Formally, they dene a blocking plan as a
mapping from AS (the set of recommended strategies in ) to AS. In their
equilibrium concept, a coalition S blocks, if for all possible realizations aS,
the blocking plan is a strict improvement for all players in S.
There is no inclusion relation between the set of strong (and coalition
proof) correlated equilibria dened by Einy and Peleg (1995) and the set of
strong (and coalition-proof) correlated equilibria dened in this paper. On
the one hand, the fact that members can freely share information about their
recommendations makes deviation easier in Einy and Peleg (1995)s sense. On
the other hand, their very strong requirement that coalitional members
4In the context of exchange economies with private information, this is equivalent to
the notion of "ne" core proposed by Wilson (1978). The problem of course is that players
announcements about the recommendation they received is not veriable, and blocking
plans may not be credible in our sense.
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are better o¤ for any realization of the correlated strategy makes deviations
harder. Consider for instance the following example of a three-player game
due to Einy and Peleg (1995).
Example 2 (Einy and Peleg (1995)) Consider the following three-player
game, where player I chooses rows (a1; a2), player II chooses columns (b1; b2)
and player III choose matrices (c1; c2).
3,2,0 0,0,0
2,0,3 2,0,3
3,2,0 0,3,2
0,0,0 0,3,2
Einy and Peleg (1995) argue that the following is a strong correlated
equilibrium.
1/3 0
0 1/3
0 1/3
0 0
To prove their claim, they note that for any two-player coalition, there
exists one realization of the correlated strategies for which no strict improve-
ment is possible. (For S = f1; 2g, the realization (a1; b1), for S = f2; 3g, the
realization (b2; c2) and for S = f1; 3g, the realization (a2; c1).)
With our denition, we claim that this correlated strategy is not a ISCE.
Consider the coalition S = f1; 2g and the realization (a2; b2). Player 1 then
knows that 3 has received the recommendation c1 and that 2 has received the
recommendation b2. Player 2 puts equal probability to (a2;c1) and (a1; c2).
Consider the admissible event E1 = fa1; a2g; E2 = fb2g: For this event, both
players have a blocking plan (a1; b1) and E satises self-selection, as player 1
knows that player 2 has received recommendation b2. Hence, coalition f1; 2g
blocks the correlated strategy at the realization (a2; b2) and the correlated
strategy is not a strong correlated equilibrium.5
5In fact, Moreno and Wooders (1996) use this example to show that there exist games
with no ex ante coalition proof correlated equilibrium. The fact that a strong correlated
equilibrium exists in Einy and Peleg (1995)s sense shows that their denition makes
blocking extremely di¢ cult.
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4 Strong Correlated Equilibria
Strong correlated equilibrium is a very demanding concept as any joint cor-
related deviation can be used to upset the initial correlated strategy. In fact,
even games possessing pure strategy strong Nash equilibria may not have
any ISCE as we show in the following examples. We then go on to show
that there is in fact no relationship at all between the existence of ISCE and
strong Nash equilibrium by constructing a game which has an ISCE but no
strong Nash equilibrium. Finally, we show the existence of a class of games
where the set of ISCE is non-empty.
Example 3 Let n = 2, and each player can take action a or b.
a b
a (1 + ; ) (1; 1)
b (0; 0) (; 1 + )
Example 4
a b
a (1  ; 1  ) (1; 0)
b (0; 1) ( ; )
Example 3 is a game where both players have a favorite action (action
a for player 1 and action b for player 2), and enjoy a positive externality of
 < 1 if the other player chooses the same action. Example 4 is a game
where both players prefer action a and su¤er a negative externality of  if
the other player chooses the same action. Both games admit a unique strong
Nash equilibrium, (a; b) in Example 3 and (a; a) in Example 4. However, if
 > 1=2; (a; b) is not a strong correlated equilibrium in Example 3 because
both players have an incentive to deviate to the correlated strategy putting
equal weight on (a; a) and (b; b). Similarly, if  < 1=2; (a; a) is not a strong
correlated equilibrium in Example 4 because it is blocked by a correlated
strategy putting equal weight on (a; b) and (b; a). Furthermore, because
(a; b) in Example 3 and (a; a) in Example 4 are dominant strategy equilibria,
there is no other candidate correlated equilibrium, and hence the games do
not admit strong correlated equilibria for some ranges of the parameter .
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Examples 3 and 4 illustrate a very simple fact. When agents can choose a
correlated deviation, they can block more easily than when they can only de-
viate by choosing mixed strategies. This explains why strong Nash equilibria
may fail to be strong correlated equilibria.
On the other hand, the initial correlated strategy may give agents a higher
payo¤than a pair of mixed strategies. Hence, as the following example shows,
there exist games which do not admit a strong Nash equilibrium, but for
which a strong correlated equilibrium exists.
Example 5 Consider a three-player game where player 1 chooses the row,
player 2 the column and player 3 the matrix, with payo¤s:
b1 b2
a1 (1:5; 1:5; 0:5) (0; 0; 0)
a2 (0; 2; 0) (1; 1; 1)
b1 b2
a1 (0:5; 1:5; 1) (0; 0; 0)
a2 (1; 0; 0) (2; 1; 0:5)
This game does not admit a strong Nash equilibrium. To check this, note
that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. There is a unique mixed
strategy equilibrium in which 1 plays a1 with probability 0:136, 2 plays b1
with probability 0:864 and 3 plays c1 with probability 0:378.6 The expected
payo¤ vector corresponding to these probabilities is not e¢ cient since the
strategy vector (a2; b2; c1) yields a payo¤ of 1 to each of the players.
Consider the correlated strategy  which places equal probability on the
strategy vectors f(a1; b1; c1); (a2; b2; c1); (a1; b1; c2); (a2; b2; c2)g. This yields
the expected payo¤ vector (1:25; 1:25; 0:75).
Note rst that  is a correlated equilibirum, and hence is immune to
deviations by singletons. Consider next deviations by pairs of players. The
realized recommentations for 1 and 2 are either (a1; b1) or (a2; b2). So, 1 and
2 can both infer the recommendation received by the other player from their
own recommendation. If the joint recommendations are (a1; b1), then the
expected payo¤s are 1 and 1:5 to 1 and 2 respectively since 3 receives the
recommendations c1 and c2 with equal probability. No correlated deviation
6These numbers are correct to three decimal places.
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by 1 and 2 can bring both of them higher payo¤s. A similar analysis holds
for (a2; b2).
Also, 1 and 3 cannot construct any blocking plan. For suppose 1 has
received the recommendation a1. If 3 has received c1, then this gives 1 the
highest possible payo¤ given that 2 has received recommendation b1. Hence,
1 does not want to deviate. If 3 has received c2, then 3 has received the
highest possible payo¤. This is known to both and so there is no credible
blocking plan if 1 receives recommendation a1.A similar analysis holds if 1
has received a2.
Consider the coalition f2; 3g. If 2 receives the recommendation b1, then 2
receives 1.5 irrespective of what action is chosen by 3 given that 1 will choose
a1. Similarly, 2 will receive 1 irrespective of the action chosen by 3 since 1
chooses action a2 in this case. Hence, 2 and 3 have no blocking plan.
Finally consider the coalition f1; 2; 3g. If 1 receives the recommendation
a1, he knows that 2 receives b1. Furthermore, by self-selection, the only
recommendation which leads player 3 to deviate is c1. At this event, the
players receive payo¤s (1:5; 1:5; 0:5). We show that there is no correlated
strategy which gives all players a higher payo¤. The only pure strategy
proles we need to consider are proles which give one of the players a higher
payo¤ than (a1; b1; c1). Let then p1 = (a2; b1; c1); p2 = (a2; b2; c1); p3 =
(a1; b1; c2) and p4 = (a2; b2; c2). For a correlated strategy to dominate
(a1; b1; c1) for all the players we then need:
p2 + 0:5p3 + 2p4  1:5
2p1 + p2 + 1:5p3 + p4  1:5
p2 + p3 + 0:5p4  0:5
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 = 1:
The third inequality implies that
p1  p2 + p3
so p1  1=2: The rst inequality amounts to
2p1 + 0:5p3  1:5
which cannot be satised if p1  1=2: If 1 receives the recommendation a2;
the only event which satises self-selection is (a2; b2; c2) at which 1 receives
his optimal payo¤ and hence has no incentive to deviate.
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Although the previous examples show that there is no logical relationship
between the existence of strong Nash equilibria and ISCE, we now show that
there is an interesting class of games for which strong Nash equilibria are
also ISCE. These are the class of games with positive externalities for which
strong Nash equilibria are known to exist. While example 3 show that in
general ISCE do not exist in such games, we provide su¢ cient conditions for
the existence of ISCE.
Following Konishi et al. (1997a) and (1997b), we consider games where
all agents have the same action set, Ai = A for all i in N , and agentsutilities
only depend on their own action and the number of players who have chosen
the same action, ui(a) = Vi(ai; n(ai)) where n(ai) denotes the number of
agents who have chosen action ai. If Vi is increasing in ai, the game is a
game with positive externalities. If Vi is decreasing in ai, it is a game with
negative externalities.
A simple illustration of games with positive externalities are the choices
of standards (by rms) or products (by consumers) when consumers derive
a positive utility from the number of consumers choosing the same product
(Farrell and Saloner (1985) and Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Positive exter-
nalities also arise in local public good economies, when agents choose a ju-
risdiction, and share the xed cost of the public project with other members
of the jurisdiction (Alesina and Spolaore (2003), Haimanko, Le Breton and
Weber (2004)). When jAj = 2, Konishi et al. (1997a) show that every game
admits a pure strategy strong Nash equilibrium (Proposition 2.2 p. 168).
In the next section, we will show that ICPCE exist in all games with
positive externalities provided each Ai consists of the same two actions. In
the next proposition, we further restrict the class of games with positive
externalities. In particular, we assume that the positive externality accruing
to individual i is separable in the number of individuals taking the same
action as individual i, so that
Vi(ai; n(ai)) = vi(ai) + f(n(ai)) where f 0 > 0
Now, let N1 = fi 2 N jvi(a1) > vi(a2)g, while N2 = fi 2 N jvi(a2) > vi(a1)g.
Notice that if a is to be a strong Nash equilibrium, then individuals in
N1 and N2 must choose actions a1 and a2 respectively when f(k) = 0 for all
k. Of course, this must also be an ISCE. Now, if the e¤ect of th externality
is small, then this will continue to be an ISCE. This is basically the content
of the next proposition.
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Proposition 1 Let Ai = fa1; a2g for each i 2 N . Then, there exists f with
f 0 > 0 such that for all f  f with f 0 > 0, an ISCE exists.
Proof. Since each Ai has only 2 elements, we can normalise utility functions
by setting ui(a1) = 0 for all i. Moreover, without loss of generality, assume
that ui(a2)  ui+1(a2) for all i = 1; : : : ; n  1:
Let a be a strong Nash equilibrium. Then, either all individuals take the
same action or there is k such that all i  k choose a1, while the others
choose a2. If all individuals choose the same action, then that must also be
an ISCE.
Otherwise, let (B1; B2) be the non-empty sets of individuals choosing
actions a1; a2 respectively. Then, uk(a2) < uk+1(a2), and either uk(a2) < 0
or uk+1(a2) > 0. Without loss of generality, assume uk+1(a2) = d > 0.
Now, if a coalition T 0 has a protable blocking plan, then T 0 \ B1 6= ;
and T 0\B2 6= ;. Moreover, if any coalition T 0 has a protable blocking plan,
then there is also a connected7 coalition T including k and k+1 which has
a protable blocking plan T .
Let p > 0 be the total probability with which k + 1 chooses action a1.
Then, pd is the loss in utility su¤ered by k + 1 from the switch in choice
of action. Let 1; : : : ; J be the probabilities with which k + 1 chooses the
same action as sets of individuals of size s1; : : : ; sJ . Then, in order for T to
be improving for k + 1, we need
JX
j=1
jf(sj) > pd+ f(jB1j) (2)
Consider all coalitions T including k + 1 which have improving blocking
plans. For each such coalition, and each improving blocking plan, there will
be an inequality of the form 2. Clearly, one can choose an externality"
function which violates all these inequalities. This function fullls the role
of f in the proposition.
5 Coalition Proof Correlated Equilibrium
We now turn our attention to the less demanding concept of coalition proof
correlated equilibrium. Our rst result parallels the main existence result of
7That is, if T includes i and i+ 2, then T also includes i+ 1 for all i.
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Moreno and Wooders (1996) and establishes a connection between interim
coalition proof correlated equilibrium, and the elimination of strictly domi-
nated strategies.
Denition 8 Let B =
Q
i2N
Bi  A. An action a0i 2 Bi is strictly dominated
in B if there exists i 2 Bi such that for each a i 2 B i;X
ai2Bi
i(ai)ui(ai; a i) > ui(a0i; a i):
Denition 9 The set A1 of action proles surviving iterated elimination of
dominated strategies is dened by A1 =
Q
i2N
A1i where A
1
i = \1t=0Ati and Ati
is the set of actions that are not strictly dominated in At 1 =
Q
i2N
At 1i with
A0i = Ai:
The following Proposition is analogous to the main existence result of
Moreno and Wooders (1996) (Corollary page 92).
Proposition 2 Let a be a pure strategy action prole that Pareto-dominates
any other pure strategy action prole in A1. Then a is an interim coalition
proof correlated equilibrium.
Proof. We rst show that if there exists a self-enforcing blocking plan S
against a which is preferred by the deviating coalition, then this blocking
plan must have a support contained in A1S . Suppose by contradiction that
supp(S) is not contained in A
1
S and let t
 be the largest value for which
supp(S)  AtS. Then there exists an agent i in S, and an action a0i that
agent i uses in the blocking plan S such that a
0
i is strictly dominated by i
in At

. Let i be player is prior beliefs about the recommendation of other
players, after a and S have been chosen. Suppose that, after she receives
recommendation a0i, player i deviates to playing i. This plan is self-enforcing
(because it only involves one player), and the event E = fa0igA i trivially
satises self-selection. Hence, to show that that player i has a self-enforcing
blocking plan, we only need to check that her utility strictly increases after
the deviation. First notice that, because a 2 A1; a S 2 At S, and, by
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construction, for any aSni in the support of the blocking plan S, aSni 2 AtSni.
Hence,
Ui(ija0i; A i) =
X
a i2A i
e(a ija0i; A i)ui(a0i; a i)
=
X
a i2At i
e(a ija0i; A i)ui(a0i; a i):
Similarly, as i 2 Ati
Ui(ija0i; A i) =
X
a i2A i
X
ai2Ai
e(a ija0i; A i)i(ai)ui(ai; a i)
=
X
a i2At i
X
ai2Ati
e(a ija0i; A i)i(ai)ui(ai; a i):
Because i strictly dominates a0i in A
t ; ui(a
0
i; a i) <
P
ai2Ati i(ai)ui(ai; a i)
for all a i in At

 i Hence, Ui(ija0i; A i) > Ui(ija0i; A i), establishing the
result.
Next, it is clear that if a pure action prole a Pareto-dominates any other
pure action prole in A1, it also Pareto-dominates any correlated strategy
with support contained in A1. This su¢ ces to show that there does not exist
any coalition S and blocking plan S with support in A
1 for which
ui(a
) <
X
aS2AS
S(aS)ui(a

 S; aS) for all i in S.
so that a is a coalition proof correlated equilibrium.
Some remarks are in order. First, our su¢ cient condition is stronger than
that of Moreno and Wooders (1996) who do not require the existence of a
pure action prole which Pareto-dominates all other pure action proles in
A1, but only the existence of a correlated strategy which Pareto-dominates
all other action proles in A1. Second, our result shows that if a game
is dominance-solvable (by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strate-
gies), then the unique outcome surviving the elimination of dominated strate-
gies is a coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. Finally, the existence results
of Milgrom and Roberts (1996), show existence of a pure strategy ex ante
coalition proof correlated equilibrium in games with strategic complementari-
ties admitting a unique Nash equilibrium, or for which utilities are monotonic
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in the actions of the other players (Theorem 2, P. 124). These results rely
on the same argument as the one given here the existence of a pure action
prole which Pareto-dominates any other action prole, and hence also apply
to our setting where coalitions deviate at the interim stage.
The next proposition shows that games with positive externalities and
two actions always admit a coalition proof correlated equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose Ai = fa1; a2g for all i 2 N . Then, any game with
positive externality admits an interim coalition proof correlated equilibrium.
Proof. From Konishi et al. (1997a), we know that the game admits pure
strategy strong Nash equilibria. Pick one of these strong Nash equilibria,
(characterized by a partitioning of the agents, fB1; B2g) with the property
that maxfb1; b2g  maxfc1; c2g for all other strong Nash equilibria fC1; C2g:8
In words, among all strong Nash equilibria, we choose one with the largest
number of players choosing the same action. Let T be a coalition which has a
protable blocking plan T against the pure strategy recommendation which
results in the partition fB1; B2g. We rst claim that T \Bi 6= ; for i = 1; 2 
the deviating coalition must involve players from both sides moving. Suppose
by contradiction that T  B1. (A similar argument would hold if T  B2).
Because fB1; B2g is a strong Nash equilibrium, there must exist an agent
i 2 T for whom ui(a1; b1)  ui(a2; b2 + t). But if T  B1, then for any
outcome fC1; C2g in the support of the blocking plan, c1  b1. Hence, for all
outcomes in the support of the blocking plan, agent i either chooses action
a1 in a group containing c1  b1 agents, or chooses action a2 in a group
containing c2  b2 + t agents. In either case, his utility is less than or equal
to ui(a1; b1) and he cannot participate in the blocking plan.
Let T1 = T \ B1 and T2 = T \ B2:Without loss of generality, suppose
that b1  b2. Consider the partition fB1 [ T2; B2nT2g. By assumption, this
partition is not a strong Nash equilibrium. We will show that there exists a
deviating coalition S  T2. First notice that B1 \ S = ;. If members of B1
had an incentive to deviate collectively in the partition fB1[T2; B2nT2g, they
would also have an incentive to deviate in the partition fB1; B2g, contradict-
ing the fact that fB1; B2g is a strong Nash equilibrium. Notice furthermore
that if there exists a deviating coalition S containing members of T2 and
8Here, Bi; Ci denote the set of agents choosing action ai for i = 1; 2. Also, we use b; c
for the cardinality of the sets B;C.
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B2nT2, there also exists another deviating coalition S 0 only containing mem-
bers of T2. Hence, if there is no deviating coalition S satisfying S  T2, it
must be that all deviating coalitions are included in B2nT2. Consider then
the largest deviating coalition, S, for which ui(a1; b1+ t2+s) > ui(a2; b2  t2)
for all i 2 S, and the resulting partition fB1 [ T2 [ S;B2nT2nSg. Again, this
partition is not a strong Nash equilibrium, and there must exist a deviat-
ing coalition U . Now, as no subset of players of B1 [ T2 wanted to deviate
from the partition fB1 [ T2; B2nT2g, there is no collective deviation includ-
ing members of B1 [ T2. Furthermore, as ui(a1; b1 + t2 + s) > ui(a2; b2   t2),
there is no collective deviation from members of S either. Hence, we must
have U  B2nT2nS. The process can be repeated until the formation of the
partition fN; ;g, at whiich point we reach a contradiction, because this par-
tition is not a strong Nash equilibrium, and it is impossible to construct a
deviating coalition. Hence, there must exist a deviating coalition S from
fB1 [ T2; B2nT2g such that S  T2.
Finally, we show that this implies that there exists a self-enforcing block-
ing plan, S against the original deviation T . Consider the plan where mem-
bers of S always choose action a2. Every member i of S will then receive
at least ui(a2; b2   t2 + s) after deviating. By sticking to the recommenda-
tion a1, he would receive at most ui(a1; b1 + t2   (s   1))  ui(a1; b1 + t2).
Because S is a deviating coalition from the partition fB1 [ T2; B2nT2g,
ui(a2; b2   t2 + s) > ui(a1; b1 + t2) for all i 2 S, and hence the blocking
plan S is protable. Finally, the blocking plan is self-enforcing, because no
subcoalition of S can guarantee a higher payo¤ to all its members, as this
would involve some players moving back to action a1.
6 Conclusion
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated
equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share in-
formation about their recommendations in a credible way. Our analysis
highlights the di¤erence between the coalitional deviations at the ex ante
stage studied by Moreno and Wooders (1996) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1996), and the coalitional deviations at the interim stage. Whereas ex ante
ccoalition-proof correlated equilibria always exist in two-player games, we
provide an example of a two-player game which does not admit any interim
coalition-proof correlated equilibrium. Following the same line of argument
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as Moreno and Wooders (1996), we provide a su¢ cient condition for exis-
tence based on the existence of a Pareto-dominant strategy in the set of
strategies surviving iterative elimination of dominated strategies. However,
the su¢ cient condition for existence of an interim coalition-proof correlated
equilibrium is strictly stronger than the su¢ cient condition uncovered by
Moreno and Wooders (1996) for the existence of an ex ante coalition-proof
correlated equilibrium. Finally, we identify a class of games with positive
externalities, already studied by Konishi et al. (1997), which always admit
interim coalition-proof correlated equilibria.
In our view, the study of coalitional deviations in games with communi-
cation is a rst step towards the study of coalitional deviations in general
Bayesian games. Our denition of credible information sharing could easily
be adapted to a setting where agents have di¤erent (privately known) types,
and our equilibrium concepts could easily be applied to general games with
incomplete information. We plan to pursue this agenda in future research,
thereby making progress on the study of cooperation and coalition formation
among agents with incomplete information.
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